Everybody’s a Victim? Global Terror, Well-Being and Political Attitudes by Akay, Alpaslan et al.
ISSN 1403-2473 (Print)  
ISSN 1403-2465 (Online) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper in Economics No. 733  
 
 
Everybody’s a Victim? Global Terror, Well-
Being and Political Attitudes 
 
Alpaslan Akay, Olivier Bargain, Ahmed Elsayed  
 
Department of Economics,  June 2018
 
 
Everybodys a Victim?
Global Terror, Well-Being and Political Attitudes
Alpaslan Akay, Olivier Bargain, Ahmed Elsayed
June 2018
Abstract
Terror has become a global issue. Terror acts perpetuated by religious, nationalist or
political groups around the globe can propagate distress rapidly through di¤erent channels
and possibly change political attitudes. This paper suggests the rst evaluation of the
impact of global terror on human welfare. We combine panel datasets for Australia,
Germany, Russia, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Individual well-being information
for 750; 000 individualyear observations, recorded on precise dates, is matched with
daily information on the 70; 000 terror events that took place worldwide during 1994-
2013. High-frequency data and quasi-random terror shocks of varying intensity provide
the conditions for robust inference, while external validity is guaranteed by the use of
large representative samples. We nd a signicantly negative e¤ect of global terror on
well-being, with a money-metric cost of around 6%   17% of national income. Among
di¤usion channels, stock markets and economic anticipations play a minimal role, while
traditional media lter the most salient events. The e¤ect is greatly modulated by the
physical, genetic or cultural proximity to the terror regions/victims. For a subset of
countries, we also show that global terror has signicantly increased the intention to
vote for conservative parties. Heterogeneity analyses point to the mediating e¤ect of risk
perception: individuals who exhibit stronger emotional responses to terror possibly more
exposed to potential threats are also more likely to experience a conservative shift.
Key Words : Global Terror, Subjective Well-Being, Media, Political Attitudes.
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1 Introduction
Intentional and indiscriminate acts of violence have been perpetuated by individuals, groups
or organizations since ancient times, as a means of creating fear to achieve political, religious
or ideological aims. Traditionally, the material and human costs of religious fanaticism or
political radicalism have been borne by local populations and states. However, in recent years,
terror has become a global issue. Violent acts are increasingly transnational in the sense
that they rely on funding and infrastructures from di¤erent countries, pursue international
objectives or target groups beyond national borders. In an integrated world economy, terror
events also reverberate through economic channels, chiey through stock prices (e.g. Abadie
and Gardeazabal, 2003) or commodity prices (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2010). Moreover,
new information and communication technologies mean that a local event can reach people
worldwide. Researchers have commented on the symbiotic relationship between mass media
and terrorism (Rohner and Frey, 2007), especially now that the audience is global and terror
groups seek international exposure to exert pressure. Social media has accelerated this trend
and is increasingly used as a way to propagate fear at a very broad scale. As a modern
psychological warfare, the "theater of terror" tends to reach far beyond the immediate victims
of terrorism (Weimann, 2005).
Against this background, a comprehensive evaluation of the global impact of terror on human
welfare is required. To date, most evaluations focus on the local consequences of terror. The
bulk of the literature deals with economic aspects,1 and a few studies address the social and
psychological impact of terror using self-reported measures of well-being.2 Most of them nd
that the loss exceeds the purely economic consequences of terror. While these studies provide
evidence on the local experience of terror, little is known about the global welfare implications.
An exception is the study by Metcalfe et al. (2011), who estimate the impact of 9/11 on
mental health in the UK. A related question pertains to the subsequent e¤ects of fear and
distress on preferences and behavior. Several studies focus on the impact of terror on voting
1Valiño et al. (2010) survey the evaluations of direct and indirect costs of terror. Specic studies assess the
local impact of terror on growth (Blomberg et al, 2004) and scal revenue (Chernick and Haughwout, 2006),
particularly in conjunction with the e¤ects on investment (Fielding, 2003), rmsprots and their business
prospects (Frey et al., 2007) or specic sectors like tourism (Fleischer and Buccola, 2002), transportation
(Blunk et al., 2006) and insurance (Cummins et al., 2003, Brown et al., 2004). Long-term impacts on health 
as measured by birth weight are studied in Camacho (2008).
2Frey et al. (2009) study the impact of terror events in France and Northern Ireland. Romanov et al. (2012)
explore the e¤ect of attacks on Israeliswell-being. Clark et al. (2017) investigate the impact of the 2013
Boston marathon bombing on Americanswell-being. In psychology and medical sciences, many studies have
explored the local impact of attacks like 9/11 in New York (Silver et al., 2012), the July 2005 terrorist attacks
in London (Rubin et al., 2005) or March 2004 attacks in Madrid (Salguero et al., 2011). Some studies address
the intangible e¤ects felt elsewhere in the country (Silver et al, 2002, Krueger, 2007).
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behavior (e.g. Berrebi and Klor, 2008, Montalvo, 2011) or support of democratic institutions
(e.g. Rehman and Vanin, 2017). Again, most of them consider local implications. Among
exceptions, Finseraas and Listhaug (2013) study the impact of the 2008 attacks in Mumbai
on fear and public opinion in Europe. In this vein, we suggest a general assessment of how
the global tension of terror may a¤ect the well-being of Western citizens, their risk perception
and political attitudes. Rather than focusing on particular events like 9/11, we rely on high-
frequency variation in the intensity of world terror over a long period of time.
We make use of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD hereafter), which records all terrorist
acts, dened as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor
to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation".
We focus on the twenty years between 1994 and 2013, a period during which around 70; 000
terror events took place across the world. We match information on these events with individual
data from six countries representing around 640 million people. For this purpose, we assemble
six panel datasets from Germany, the UK, Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Australia
and the US. While these panels have been extensively used individually, pooling them into a
large international longitudinal dataset is unique. The total sample comprises almost 750; 000
individualyear observations. They all contain information on subjective well-being (SWB
hereafter), notably on life satisfaction, frequently used as a proxy for utility (Kahneman and
Sugden, 2005). A subset of countries additionally contain information on political attitudes.
Terror events, recorded daily in the GTD, are matched to our six-country sample using interview
dates. We start with regressions of daily life satisfaction on a detailed set of controls and on
several measures of terror intensity, notably the total incidence of terror events and the total
number of subsequent fatalities each day. Comparing individuals observed just before and
after a certain day (betweenvariation) provides quasi-experimental identication of the terror
e¤ect that day. We exploit this logic over a multitude of events: inference is obtained from the
uctuation in terror intensity over the 7; 305 days of the 1994-2013 period.
The results point to a signicant and depressing e¤ect of global terror on human welfare. A
battery of sensitivity checks conveys that this e¤ect is extremely stable to modeling options
(data harmonization across countries, estimation methods and specications, timing assump-
tions, etc.). In particular, the estimates do not change much with the inclusion of individual
xed e¤ects, suggesting that betweenvariation provides a robust identication of the average
global terror e¤ect. On average over the period, citizens of our sampled countries are ready
to give up between 6% and 17% of their income to end world terror. Although terror is ex-
pected to exacerbate fear (Becker and Rubinstein, 2011), this is an extremely large emotional
response given the microscopic chances that any of the events a¤ect these peoples lives directly.
Nonetheless, this result is consistent with the literature on the formation of risk perception in
the context of rare events (Sunstein, 2003). Importantly, evidence is obtained here from high-
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frequency data and representative samples rather than from small-scale experiments. A rich
heterogeneity analysis can be performed. First, the average treatment e¤ect can be decom-
posed in a discrete set of days of di¤erent terror magnitudes: it shows that the SWB response
increases monotonically with terror intensity. It is very large in the top quartile, containing
salient events like 9/11, but the e¤ect is not (only) driven by such events: it is sizable and very
signicant for days of more moderate terror intensity.
We then exploit heterogeneity across days to establish how the perception of terror threats may
vary. We rst distinguish between local and foreign terror. The few local events (4:4% of all
events) generate much larger e¤ects, but the impact of foreign terror the original focus of our
study is sizable and drives our main e¤ect. Subsequently, we test several di¤usion channels.
Stock markets and the anticipation of impaired economic exchanges with terror regions seem
to play a modest role. A larger mediation is found through traditional and social media in a
subset of countries for which media information is available. Media coverage data shows that
the main TV channels in Germany, the US and the UK cover 25% of all the global terror events.
They lter terror acts that are most relevant/proximate to Western audiences and that produce
larger well-being e¤ects. Interestingly, uncovered events also have a signicant (even if smaller)
e¤ect, which reects the background noiseof global terror, possibly conveyed by alternative
information sources including social media. Another lter is distance: using variation in terror
events, we show that the signal of global terror is stronger when terror harms populations that
are physically, genetically, culturally or religiously close to the interviewees. Finally, we explore
individual heterogeneity: people most a¤ected by terror are older, more risk averse or feel more
exposed to potential threats (for instance, because they live in densely-populated areas or near
migrants from terror countries).
These results can be interpreted as a characterization of how the perception of terror threats
varies (across days or individual types). Experimental evidence actually suggests that an in-
creased risk perception entails changes in political or civic attitudes. It is often associated
with more conservative views (Lerner et al., 2003, Huddy et al., 2005) and the readiness to
trade o¤ civil liberties for enhanced security (Bozzoli and Müller, 2011). We suggest an origi-
nal assessment of whether global terror is responsible for a change in voting attitudes. Given
data availability, we can address this question only for a subset of countries (Germany, the US
and Switzeland). We show that global terror signicantly increases the intentions to vote for
conservative parties during 1994-2013. Daily variation in terror intensity a¤ects political views
by possibly changing the perception of threat exposure, as reected in SWB responses. This is
corroborated by the co-movement between emotional and political responses across individual
types: we nd that those exhibiting larger SWB responses to terror possibly feeling more
exposed are also more likely to experience a conservative shift. We close this study with a
discussion of promising research avenues using the present approach and notably the decom-
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position of time periods or the extension to poorer countries and alternative outcomes. We
highlight the possible use of SWB as a yardstick for determining the degree of emotional shocks
that could trigger changes in behavior and attitudes towards democracy, security, minorities or
migration.
2 Empirical Approach
2.1 An International Panel of Individual Well-Being
Data Selection. We construct a panel of individuals covering several countries with compa-
rable well-being measures and determinants. We focus on a relatively homogeneous group of six
rich countries: Germany, the UK, Switzerland, the Russia Federation, the US and Australia.
This choice is also guided by data availability: we combine six large household panels that con-
tain SWB information at the individual level and over a relatively long period. These datasets
and the years when SWB information is available are as follows: the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP, 1984-2013), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, 1996-2008), the Swiss
Household Panel (SHP, 1999-2013), the Russian Labor Monitoring Survey (RMLS, 2000-2013),
the Australian Household Income Dynamics (HILDA, 2001-2013) and the US Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID, 2009, 2011, 2013).3 These datasets also contain a wealth of individual
characteristics that can be used as controls in SWB equations.
We focus on 1994-2013. Datasets are collected at di¤erent periods (starting 1984 for Germany)
and our time window is guided by data constraints and the relatively homogeneous treatment
of all countries under study  notably the fact that key variables are missing in panels for
some years and that terror data is not available for 1993. Note that some countries o¤er better
coverage than others: for instance, all of the relevant information is available in the GSOEP
over the period studied but SWB information is only present in the PSID in waves 2009,
2011 and 2013. Sensitivity analyses will show that this is not detrimental to our results. In
particular, signicant terror e¤ects are not driven by a particular country. Nonetheless, di¤erent
observational periods across datasets prevent us from identifying time-specic heterogeneity of
terror e¤ects, e.g. before and after 9/11 (a modest attempt to elicit time variation is suggested
in the concluding discussion).
Sample selection is applied uniformly to all countries. We focus on individuals aged between
18 and 75. Our baseline excludes rst-generation migrants. Introducing them would bring in
3These datasets have been used extensively in SWB studies, for instance in Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters
(2004, GSOEP), Clark and Oswald (1994, BHPS), Stutzer (2004, SHP), Senik (2004, RMLS), Feddersen et al.
(2016, HILDA) or Brown et al. (2017, PSID). See Powdthavee (2015) for a clear overview of existing SWB
datasets and their use.
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confounding factors regarding terror events possibly happening in their home country. Each
person is interviewed once a year and the precise date is recorded and used to match terror
information, as described below.
Measures of Well-Being. A rapidly-growing amount of evidence collected by economists
and psychologists has shown that SWB is not pure statistical noise and can be validated in
numerous ways (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006), notably against behavior (Benjamin et al.,
2012) and more objective measures of well-being (Krueger and Schkade, 2008, Oswald and
Wu, 2010). Self-reported measures of well-being provide new insights into phenomena that are
di¢ cult to apprehend with the traditional revealed preference approach (see Clark et al., 2008,
and Senik, 2005). For instance, this includes the e¤ect of unemployment (Clark and Oswald,
1994, Di Tella et al., 2001), climate change (Frijters and van Praag, 1998), air quality (Levinson,
2012), economic status (Luttmer, 2005) or decentralization (Flèche, 2017).
The SWB measure used in this study is based on the life-satisfaction question, which is usually
strongly correlated with other subjective measures of well-being like self-reported happiness
or composite indices of mental health (Clark and Oswald, 1994). Life satisfaction has the
advantage of being present and relatively comparable across the di¤erent datasets in use, as
explained in Appendix A1. The answer is reported in ascending order of satisfaction on di¤erent
scales: 1-5 in the RMLS and PSID, 1-7 in the BHPS and 0-10 in the GSOEP, SHP and HILDA.
We harmonize the scales across datasets by expanding the life-satisfaction answers in the PSID,
the RLMS and the BHPS to 11 points. The procedure is described in detail in Appendix A1
and alternative harmonizing approaches are presented in our sensitivity checks (notably one
collapsing answers to the least common denominator, i.e. the 5-point scale). The mean level of
SWB for each country is reported in Table A.1, in their original scale (rst row) and using the
0-10 or 1-5 harmonized scale (second and third rows). The country ordering based on mean
values is consistent across scales, with the highest score reached in Switzerland and the lowest
in Russia.
A usual concern among economists is the di¢ culty to perform interpersonal comparison of
utility. SWB measures do not escape from this discussion. They possibly reect heterogeneity
in self-perception about ones situation (Decancq et al., 2015) or relativities regarding others
or oneself over time (aspirations). We follow the bulk of the literature and treat this issue
as a mere measurement error, namely by using large samples and accounting for xed e¤ects.
Individual e¤ects may capture time-invariant heterogeneity in actual well-being or in the way
a person reports well-being or forms aspirations. Note that we will not only focus on the
absolute e¤ect of terror on SWB scales but also on its relative e¤ect using equivalent-income
variation (see also Decancq et al., 2015, and Benjamin et al., 2014). Finally, our estimations will
control for time-varying correlates of SWB. In Appendix A1, we describe how these variables
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are made comparable across countries. Table A.1 reports statistics for the key variables. The
main determinants of SWB, income and health, are consistent with the SWB ranking across
countries: Switzerland and Russia are found to be at both ends of the distribution.
2.2 Global Terrorism Database
We use the GTD, a unique open-source dataset collected by the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. It provides comprehensive information on
terror events in the world from 1970 until present (see LaFree and Dugan, 2007, for more
information). There are some exceptions, including teh fact that 1993 is missing. The GTD
applies a consistent denition of acts of terror, as quoted in the introduction.4 More precisely,
terror acts are dened using three non-mutually exclusive criteria. Events are recorded as terror
activity if (i) they have the intention to coerce, intimidate or publicize to larger audience, (ii)
they stand outside international humanitarian law as reected in the Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions of August 1949 and (iii) they have political, economic, religious or social
motives. This denition excludes acts motivated by individual prot or unrelated to broader
societal change. In particular, hate crimes or mass shooting in the US which most often lack
a clear political or social motivation are not included. The immense majority of the 70; 118
terror acts recorded over the period take place abroad (i.e. only 4:4% take place in our sampled
countries: 1:6% in the ve Western countries and 2:8% in Russia).5
Figure 1 displays the number of terror events and casualties per day. Figure 2 shows a distri-
bution summary of both events and casualties.6 The average number of events per day is 9:6
and the average daily number of fatalities is 22:5. There are several terror events occurring
almost every day around the globe over the whole period. Precisely, out of the 7; 305 days
between the 1st of January 1994 and the 31st of December 2013, only 3:7% were exempt from
terror and 10:2% from fatalities. With such little variation at the extensive margin, we are not
strongly interested in the occurrence of terror somewhere in the world on particular days. We
will rather exploit the high-frequency variation in daily counts of events and casualties revealed
by Figure 1 to capture the welfare impact of terror. In terms of time trends, Figure 1 points
to a signicant increase in terror intensity since the mid-2000s. Some have argued that global
terror has intensied partly due to the counter-productive e¤ects of the Iraq war (and the "war
4It is similar to other denitions of terrorismlike the one used in the US Code of Federal Regulations ("The
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives").
5Regarding global fatalities, 164; 423 are counted during this period, 4:5% of which concern our sample. This
comprises 1:98 percentage points for the US, 2:46 for Russia and only :0007 (107 casualties) for Australia,
Switzerland, Germany and the UK.
6Both gures are capped at 50 for clarity. Note that less than 0.5% (10%) of all days are characterized by more
than 50 events (50 casualties).
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Figure 1: Daily Events and Casualties over 1994-2013
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Figure 2: Distribution of Events and Casualties over the 7,305 Days during 1994-2013
on terror") from 2003 onwards, although evidence is unclear (Harrow, 2010).
Beyond the precise terror act criteria mentioned above which can be controlled for in our
estimations  a complete set of information is provided in the GTD, including the nature
of the events, their location, the number of persons wounded or killed, the type of attack
(e.g. hijacking, bombing), the type of target (e.g. embassy, civilians) and the purpose (e.g.
political, religious). We display the geographical distribution of terror intensity in Figure A.1
in the Appendix. Terror incidences and fatalities are widespread around the world during the
period under study. We complete the portrait of terror in Table A.2, with the total number of
events, the daily average fatalities/incidences and the breakdown by main attack characteristics
overall and by country. The main medium of attack is explosion-bombing (51% of all events,
responsible for 46% of all casualties), which sharply increases during the period. We also see
that extended events (lasting more than 24 hours) which may be more di¢ cult to match with
interview days represent only a minority (5%). The table provides statistics by years and
broad regions of the world. The majority of events (64%) are located in South/Central Asia
and Middle East/North African countries.
2.3 Empirical Strategy and Identication
Empirical Approach. We merge each (person  interview date) observation of the interna-
tional panel dataset with information on the terror events that occurred the previous day in the
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world, given the time zone where the person is located. Identication is based on short-term
uctuations in well-being and terror intensity. It is similar to the valuation of time-varying local
public good such as air quality in Levinson (2012), who matches daily self-reported happiness
and air pollution information. In our case, we value a global bad terror assuming that the
SWB recorded on day d in our panel is a¤ected by terror events taking place on day d 1. The
previous-day assumption aims to ensure visibility of the event, and full informational coverage,
although we will investigate the sensitivity to alternative matching assumptions.
The specication of the empirical model goes as follows. We estimate the life satisfaction of
individual i recorded on year t and date d (day/month) as:
W itd = Ttd 1 +Xitd+ t + d + 'i + "itd: (1)
The latent well-being W itd is considered as a proxy for the unobserved welfare of a person, for
which we observe an ordinal metric Witd = j on an ordered scale of life-satisfaction categories
j = 1; :::; J . Our baseline estimation approach comprises linear panel estimations of the ordinal
measure Witd = j, treated as as a continuous variable, with the J = 11 points scale.7 The
main covariate is the intensity of terror the day before the interview, Titd 1. As discussed,
we principally focus on two denitions of terror intensity, namely the number of global ter-
ror incidences and the number of fatalities on day d   1. We compute Titd 1 as log(terror
intensity + 1), although our conclusions show little sensitivity to the specication, given the
very low rate of zeros. The treatment e¤ect  is our key variable of interest, which we estimate
in separate regressions for incidences and fatalities. We include several controls. We account
for individual time-varying characteristics of individual i that may inuence well-being at the
time of observation (year t, date d), Xitd.8 Year dummies t may pick up the e¤ect of global
shocks on well-being that are common to all countries in each year. More exible specications
using country or region-specic time trends hardly a¤ect our results. Month dummies d may
capture seasonality in data collection (periods during which interviews are conducted) as well
as seasonality in SWB (e.g. people could be happier in spring or summer time). Individual
7Linear estimations treating j as a continuous variable ease the inclusion of panel xed e¤ects. Previous
studies show no appreciable di¤erence between estimating SWB models with linear or latent dependent variable
specication (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). Nonetheless, we will provide checks where we acknowledge
the ordinal nature of the dependent variable.
8These are the usual determinants of SWB, including marital status, family characteristics (household size and
number of children), log household income, work status, self-assessed health and education (age and gender
are picked by xed e¤ects). We also account for region dummies, which are country-specic by denition, but
not necessarily captured by individual xed e¤ects due to the fact that some people are geographically mobile
over the course of the panel. We use the 16 Federal States (Länder) of Germany, the 13 regions in the UK (9
English regions, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland), the 26 Cantons in Switzerland, a detailed classication of
13 Australian regions (constructed using information on state or territory of residence and population density),
40 political regions in Russia, and the 50 Federal States in the US.
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heterogeneity 'i is modeled as xed e¤ects in panel estimations. As discussed, they control
for time-invariant heterogeneity in well-being or the perception of life circumstances. In our
context, they may also be correlated with time-invariant individual characteristics related to
the perception of terror and exposure to threats (for instance, risk aversion or the propensity to
experience fear or compassion, which may lead to disruption in panel interviews, as discussed
below).
Identication. Cross-sectional variation in terror intensity is su¢ cient to identify the e¤ect
of terror intensity. For an illustration, let us focus on a particular day d   1 characterized by
high terror intensity. Take two sets of persons i and i0 interviewed just after and before that
day respectively:
W itd  W i0td 2 = (Ttd 1   Ttd 3) + (Xitd  Xi0td 2)+ ('i   'i0) + ("itd   "i0td 2): (2)
Identication relates in spirit with a regression discontinuity (RD) design since we exploit
treatment heterogeneity around a (time) cuto¤. In this example, the treatment e¤ect  captures
the change in terror intensity around a particular date, for instance generated by Ttd 1 >
Ttd 3  0. However, we exploit more than a switch from no event to some event. Here,
we avail of the high-frequency uctuation in terror intensity generated by the ow of terror
events (70; 000 events) over 7; 305 days. In our example, confounding events are not an issue
since identication implicitly relies on individuals observed just around the time threshold. For
instance, it is very unlikely that confounding factors (like bad politics) may codetermine SWB-
depressing events (like bad social/economic conditions) and violent acts, at least not in the
short lapse of time around every terror event recorded in our sample. Moreover, the immense
majority of world terror events take place abroad, rather that in the countries under study, so
that they can be considered as relatively exogenous to local well-being conditions. The only
issue that we can think of pertain to potential non-random attrition in interviews, which is
extensively discussed hereafter.
The betweenidentication established above is similar to Levinson (2012). We can go a little
further. With panel information, time variation between two years t and t   1 allows purging
estimations from individual xed e¤ects 'i. Cross-sectional variation around each day of po-
tential terror is therefore completed by time-demeaning as in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach
(or a di¤erence-in-discontinuity). We can illustrate this in our example with individuals i and
i0 interviewed around the terror-intensive day d   1 in year t. Taking the time di¤erence 
between both years, and assuming negligible terror intensity around interview dates in t   1,
we obtain:
W itd  W i0td 2 = Ttd 1 + (Xitd  Xi0td 2)+ ("itd  "i0td 2): (3)
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Accordingly, the e¤ect of global terror Ttd 1 is identied from cross-day comparison while
purging the estimation from individual e¤ects. To pursue the analogy with RD designs, note
that the persons observed around the (time) cuto¤ are as good as random, so that we expect
individual xed e¤ects to play a limited role in our identication. Finally, let us stress again
that this example is only an illustrative zoom on a particular day. Our global terror e¤ect is
identied by the uctuation in terror intensity over 7; 305 days and a multitude of events.
Non-Random Selection into Interviews. Identication does not require terror to occur
randomly. In fact, the GTD data shows a relatively uniform distribution of terror events
throughout the years, as reported in the rst column of Table A.3 in the Appendix. It is
nonetheless possible that some events  including some of the large ones are organized on
specic dates. 9 This is not an issue: we simply need the timing of terror to be independent from
interview dates. Then, the remaining question is whether interviews are distributed randomly
around terror events. Non-random attrition in interviews might occur if interviewees change
their next-day schedule due to the terror shock and are self-selected. Since they are likely to
be those most a­ icted by what happened, our e¤ect would be a lower bound of the average
treatment e¤ect. We provide four arguments to rule out any concern of this kind. First, xed
e¤ects should capture much of the time-invariant specicities of these persons. Second, this
issue should primarily concern local events while we focus essentially on events taking place
beyond borders. We will show that our results hold when focusing exclusively on foreign events.
Third, large events like 9/11 may create global shock waves that could a¤ect the response rate
of interviews planned on the next day in other countries. We will show that our results are not
(only) driven by major events. Fourth, and most importantly, we conduct some tests in the
spirit of the McCrary test for RD designs. Precisely, we check that the density of interviews
does not change discontinuously around the time of large events. We use the GSOEP due
its broad time coverage, which allows performing density tests for events occurring at di¤erent
points in time. For illustration, we focus on 9/11, the 2004 Madrid attacks and the 2005 London
attacks. Appendix Figure A.2 shows no sign of disruption in GSOEP interviews following these
three salient events. This should a fortiori be true for smaller events. We verify this by running
density tests over all the days (and countries) in our data.10
9Some violent acts occur on days that actually coincide with other newsworthy (and anticipated) events in order
to minimize news coverage (Durante and Zhuravskaya 2018). By contrast, others are planned to maximize the
coverage of terror in the media of targeted countries (Weimann, 2005) or inuence the next day elections
(Montalvo, 2011), for instance. On the non-random timing of terror, see Pape (2003).
10For each day in our 20-year sample, we run a regression of the number of daily interviews over a one-month
bandwidth around that day. We use a cubic spline specication and a dummy for a potential discontinuity on
this day. From this large series of estimations, we obtain a uniform distribution of the p-values for the potential
discontinuity in interview rates, and a :50 average p-value. Less than 5% of the days generate a signicant drop
in density (p < :05): further regressions show that these cases are unrelated to the previous day (or same day)
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Power and the Distribution of Events/Interviews over Time. The power required to
identify the e¤ect of a particular event pertains again to the spirit of a RD design: a su¢ cient
number of observations is needed just before and after this event. This is the requirement
in Metcalfe et al. (2011) who focus on a unique event. It is considerably relaxed in our
setting. We exploit an extremely large number of events throughout the period, hence we
benet from repeated day di¤erentials of similar intensity. Nonetheless, our estimate would
not be representative of the average world terror intensity during 1994-2013 if interviews were
insu¢ ciently spread over each year. This would particularly be the case if terror events showed
strong seasonality, leading to a mismatch with the periods during which interviews take place.
Reassuringly, as already pointed out, Table A.3 reveals a relatively uniform distribution of
terror events over the year (rst column). Besides, there is a fairly large overlap with the
months during which interviews took place (second column). Even if there is some seasonality
in the distribution of interviews within countries, a large number of observations is available at
each point in time throughout the year.
2.4 An Intuition of the Results
Before moving to the estimation results, we can provide a graphical illustration of the causal
relationship between welfare levels in the six countries and global terror intensity. We rst
clean observations from common year e¤ects and individual xed e¤ects (to improve SWB
comparability and purge from factors like country xed e¤ects). We take the residual of a
basic regression W it = t + 'i + uit as our individual welfare measure, which we plot against
terror intensity. Rather than showing every data point on a crowded graph, or even the mean
values of each of the 7; 305 days, we group observations into equal-sized bins. Figure 3 displays
the binned scatterplot, i.e. the bin average values of welfare and terror intensity, as well as
the trend line. With both the incidents and fatalities, we observe a clear negative relationship
between welfare and global terror. This pattern is very suggestive but shows only a correlation.
As demonstrated above, micro regressions will capture a causal link between well-being and
global terror using betweenvariation in terror intensity. Days of particularly intensive world
terror pervade Western lives and create welfare shocks, which are susceptible to have further
consequences on attitudes and behavior, as we shall see.
terror intensity.
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Figure 3: Well-Being and Global Terror, 1994-2013
3 The Welfare E¤ect of Global Terror
3.1 Baseline Results
We rst present our main results, namely the estimation of model (1) on our six-country panel
data. It relates the daily intensity of global terror to individual SWB in these countries,
conditional on various individual and family circumstances. We also address the sensitivity of
our results to a battery of checks using alternative estimation methods, alternative measures
of SWB or terror intensity, alternative specications and alternative timings of events.11 All
tables of estimates that follow report the coe¢ cients on log terror intensity  and, for the
purpose of equivalent income calculations, the coe¢ cient ln y on log household income.12
Global Terror E¤ect. Our main results are presented in the rst column of Table 1. We
use linear panel estimations with xed e¤ects, treating the 11-point measure of life satisfaction
as a continuous variable. The intensity of terror whether the number of events or the number
11In all specications, standard errors are clustered at the year  country level to account for error autocorre-
lation across citizens of the same country. We have alternatively clustered at the time  region level or at the
individual level. Given the very large sample size, standard errors only slightly increase in these cases and our
conclusions remain unchanged.
12The complete set of life-satisfaction estimates is available from the authors. It shows very standard results
(as surveyed in Clark et al., 2008). Essentially, income, good health and being married are positively related to
SWB while being unemployed is negatively correlated. The impact of these variables is very comparable and
stable across countries, an interesting regularity discussed in the literature (e.g. Akay et al., 2017).
13
of fatalities  depresses individual welfare in a very signicant way.13 Notice that a higher
intensity of terror may imply a higher chance of being informed and hence of being exposed.
We investigate the potential non-linearity of the terror e¤ect. We use dummies for the second,
third and fourth quartiles of terror intensity (in turn for incidences and fatalities). Table 1
reports their e¤ects relative to the rst quartile. For both incidences and fatalities, we observe
a consistent monotonic relationship: the response gradually increases with terror intensity.
Arguably, in the case of fatalities, e¤ects in quartiles 2 and 3 are not very di¤erent from each
other, while the e¤ect of quartile 4 is much larger. Most importantly, for both measures,
all quartiles 2-4 are very signicant, which conveys that our average e¤ect is not only driven
by days/events of exceptionally high terror intensity. Alternative unreported estimations also
conrm that our average e¤ect does not vary much when taking out extreme points (like 9/11,
which is the largest event with 3; 003 fatalities). As previously discussed, these checks are also
important if large events like 9/11 were to a¤ect the timing of interviews in a non-random way.
Table 1: Welfare Impact of Global Terror: Baseline Results
Terror Incidence (log) -0.0148 *** -0.0102 *** -0.0193 *** -0.0268 ***
(0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0051)
Household Income (log) 0.0849 *** 0.0849 ***
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Terror Effect: Equivalent Income -0.174 -0.12 -0.23 -0.32
R-Squared 0.077
Terror Fatalities (log) -0.0076 *** -0.0106 *** -0.0110 *** -0.0266 ***
(0.0014) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0046)
Household Income (log) 0.0848 *** 0.0849 ***
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Terror Effect: Equivalent Income -0.090 -0.12 -0.13 -0.31
R-Squared 0.077
#Observations 750,691
# Terror Incidents
or Fatalities (log)
Q2 Q3 Q4
Quartiles of Terror Incidence or Fatalities
750,691
Linear estimations of life satisfaction on incidences or fatalities (log #, dummy or quartiles). Models control for age,
education, marital status, health indicator, household size, # of children, log household income, year, month, country
specific region of residence (the 16 Federal States of Germany, the 13 regions in the UK, the 26 Cantons in
Switzerland, a detailed classification of 13 Australian regions, 40 political regions in Russia, and the 50 Federal States
in the US) and individual fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
0.078
0.078
13Unreported standardized coe¢ cients indicate that a one standard-deviation increase in incidents (fatalities)
is associated with a decline of 0:6% (0:5%) of a standard deviation in SWB. While this may seem modest, it
reects the huge cross-sectional variance in SWB and is very much in line with the literature. For the largest
event (the 9/11 attacks), Metcalfe et al. (2011) report a point estimate of the e¤ect of 5%  9% of a standard
deviation in mental health.
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Note that the average e¤ect reported in Table 1 can be interpreted as the impact of an average
day of global terror over twenty years. Every day, everyone is treated: both the control
individual interviewed before that particular day and the treatedperson interviewed just after.
We simply observe them at di¤erent points in time for inference. Thus, everyone is constantly
treated by a ow of world terror of varying intensity.14 The e¤ect of mean terror intensity may
be smaller at the end of the period under study, if a long-term habituation to terror news exists.
It may also be lower, if awareness/exposure increases through more aggressive media coverage
(or the emergence of social media) in the recent years. While we are not able to explore this
question with the data at hand, we touch upon time variation in the concluding section.
Equivalent Income. Since log income is included in our empirical model, we can assess
the magnitude of the terror e¤ect by computing an equivalent income variation. SWB has
been used for some time to obtain money metric measures of public goods (e.g. air quality,
Levinson, 2012) or public bad (e.g. unemployment, Di Tella et al., 2001). We suggest the rst
equivalent income measure of global terror. With a specication whereby terror intensity and
income enter in log terms, it is easily shown that =ln y, the coe¢ cient of log intensity over
that of log household income, is an equivalent income elasticity. As reported in Table 1, we
obtain an elasticity of  :17 ( :09) with incidences (fatalities), i.e. a 1% increase in the count of
terror events (fatalities) is equivalent to a 0:17% (0:09%) decrease in household income. With
an infra-marginal interpretation, these gures actually tell us that the complete elimination of
global terror would require giving away a large share of ones income, namely between 9% and
17%.
Comparisons. It is useful to provide some elements of comparison despite the fact that other
studies mostly look at the e¤ect of specic events and the local welfare implications of terror. In
this regard, they are expected to yield larger equivalent income e¤ects than ours. For instance,
Frey et al. (2009) compare France and the British Islands. The ferocity of the Northern Ireland
conict explains that a British resident would be willing to pay between 26% (fatalities) and
37% (incidents) of income to avoid violence, while a Parisian would be willing to forego between
4% (fatalities) and 8% (incidents). The only study considering the e¤ect of terror abroad is
Metcalfe et al. (2011). Assessing the impact of 9/11 on British mental health, they report an
equivalent income e¤ect ranging from 31% to 71% depending on modeling choices (seasonal
controls or not). They advise a cautious reading of this result because, in the absence of a
signicant income e¤ect, they base their calculation on a marginal utility of income drawn
14Since we capture the average response to this repeated background noiseof terror, it is di¢ cult to speak
about adaptation. The concept is more relevant when focusing on a particular event/day. For instance, previous
studies have assessed the recovery time to specic events like 9/11 (Krueger, 2007) or the Boston Marathon
bombing (Clark et al., 2017).
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from external sources. In the present case, we obtain signicant and relatively stable e¤ects
of income (we address this point later). Moreover, Metcalfe et al. focus on the extreme point
of our terror event distribution (9/11). As can be seen in Table 1, equivalent income e¤ects
for the top quartile (which includes 9/11 and other large events) are 31%  32%, hence in the
range of values obtained by these authors.
3.2 Sensitivity Checks
In Appendix B, we suggest an extensive series of robustness checks. We rst verify whether
the results are sensitive to alternative controls on terror regions (Appendix B.1, Table B.1). In
particular, we check whether the fatality e¤ect reects the characteristics of the main event of
the previous day (for instance, whether the emotional shock is due to the type of attack, e.g.
bombing, rather than to the death toll per se). We also control for the complete set of past-day
terror location dummies and, alternatively, for the physical or genetic distance to the terror
countries. We nd little variation compared to the baseline.
Next, we check the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative estimation methods (Appendix
B.2, Table B.2). The results are extremely stable, in particular when acknowledging the ordinal
nature of the dependent variable with a xed-e¤ects ordered logit estimation. Interestingly, the
e¤ect is also similar to the baseline when ignoring xed e¤ects (i.e. in pooled linear estima-
tions). This is an important result: it conrms that individual unobserved heterogeneity plays
a minor role and that betweenvariation around terror days is su¢ cient to achieve robust iden-
tication. Arguably, equivalent income e¤ects are slightly smaller, between 6% (fatalities) and
10% (incidences), although this is almost entirely due to the larger income e¤ect obtained in
pooled estimations. The latter is intuitively explained: individuals adapt to higher income (see
Luttmer, 2005), so that withinvariation (in xed e¤ects estimations) is expected to be lower
than betweenvariation (in pooled estimations). Notwithstanding, the coe¢ cient on income
remains in the same order of magnitude.15
Further, we nd that the results are not very sensitive to alternative specications of the model
with respect to the main explanatory variables (Appendix B.3, Table B.3), notably the separate
estimation of incidence and fatality e¤ects or the use of a linear (rather than log) function of
terror intensity. Our ndings are also very robust to the way in which we harmonize SWB
scales across countries: with the 5-point scale, the coe¢ cients are close to half of the estimates
on the 11-scale and yield very similar equivalent income e¤ects.
Finally, we address the timing assumptions made to match terror and interview days (Appendix
15It is possible that reverse causality between income and SWB actually means that we still underestimate
well-being returns to income (Luttmer, 2005). Even though, the terror e¤ect would remain signicant. Its
equivalent income interpretation would simply become more modest.
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B.4, Table B.4). There may be a little fuzziness in the treatment status due to the fact that
individuals interviewed on terror day are implicitly counted in the control group (together with
all those interviewed the days before). This should lead to a slight underestimation of our
terror e¤ect inasmuch as some of them have already been a¤ected. With a large number of
interviewees on both side of the time cuto¤, this makes little di¤erence. Note that the timing
of interviews is generally recorded but the timing of terror events is unknown or is spread
over several hours which makes the time matching di¢ cult. Our previous-day assumption
appears to be a reasonable choice and generates the largest e¤ects, as explained in Appendix
B.4.
3.3 Further Results
Terror at Home or Away. We rst check whether people are more a¤ected when terror
events actually takes place on their doorstep. Table 2 reproduces our baseline (Column 1) and
compares it to the e¤ect of terror intensity within the persons own country (Column 2). As
expected, local terror drives larger well-being responses, i.e. around twice as large as the baseline
e¤ect. It is equivalent in magnitude to the top quarter of global terror (see the last column
of Table 1). Local terror may well have large e¤ects, it occurs very infrequently compared
to events abroad. As noted before, only 1:6% of the 70; 118 terror incidents during 1994-2013
occurred in the Western countries of our sample (4:4% when including Russia). Hence, we
expect our baseline e¤ect  the global terror e¤ect  to be mainly driven by foreign events.
This is conrmed in Table 2 (Column 3): the e¤ect of foreign terror is highly signicant and
only slightly smaller than the baseline.16
International Variation. We then ask whether the global terror e¤ect is universal or driven
by some of our sampled countries. Given the size of the GSOEP, Germany represents 39% of our
international sample. Column 4 of Table 2 shows that our results are not strongly inuenced
by this country: the global terror e¤ect is smaller but still signicant in the 5-country panel
excluding Germany. The rest of the table reports terror e¤ects for each country separately.
As expected, terror coe¢ cients are less precisely estimated in this case, although the estimates
are relatively consistent across countries. The coe¢ cient on terror incidence is signicant in all
cases except Russia. Equivalent income e¤ects are in a range from  :14 (the UK) to  :32 (the
US), hence surrounding the average baseline e¤ect of  :17. The US estimate stands out, at
around twice as large as the average. Interestingly, this result echoes with the fact that counter-
terrorism expenditures in the US are also much larger, at around twice those of other Western
16The di¤erence with the local terror e¤ect of column 2 is nonetheless signicant (the p-value of an equality
test between coe¢ cients is :023 for incidence and :096 for fatalities). Compared to the local terror e¤ect, the
impact of global terror is also more precisely estimated given the larger variation in terror intensity.
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countries.17 The e¤ect of terror fatalities is consistently smaller, as found on average, but
very stable across countries. It is signicant in all countries except Switzerland and the US,
which is likely due to smaller samples and hence less precise estimates in the case of these
countries (they represent only 5:4% and 3:3% of our international panel respectively). However,
in equivalent-income terms, country-specic e¤ects are all in a very narrow range from  :05 to
 :10, surrounding the baseline of  :09.
Table 2: Welfare Impact of Local and Global Terror, Overall and By Country
# Incidences (log) -0.0148 *** -0.0252 *** -0.0108 *** -0.0095 *** -0.0143 *** -0.0122 ** -0.0198 ** -0.0011 -0.0122 * -0.0270 **
(0.0026) (0.0056) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0046)    (0.0048)    (0.0102)    (0.0056) (0.0068) -0.0129
Equivalent Income -0.17 -0.30 -0.13 -0.11 -0.17 -0.14 -0.23 -0.01 -0.14 -0.32
# Fatalities (log) -0.0076 *** -0.0137 *** -0.0064 *** -0.0060 *** -0.0055 ** -0.0041 * -0.0071 -0.0052 * -0.0083 ** -0.0047
(0.0014) (0.0042) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0024)    (0.0023)    (0.0057)    (0.0031)    (0.0037)    (0.0077)
Equivalent Income -0.09 -0.16 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06
R-Squared 0.077 0.081 0.080 0.070 0.203 0.110 0.069 0.140 0.119 0.074
#Observations 750,691 750,691 750,691 449,012 301,679 140,600 40,479 134,846 108,164 24,923
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(PSID)
Linear estimations of life satisfaction on incidences or fatalities. Models control for age, education, marital status, health indicator, household size, # of children, log
household income, year, month, country specific region of residence (the 16 Federal States of Germany, the 13 regions in the UK, the 26 Cantons in Switzerland, a
detailed classification of 13 Australian regions, 40 political regions in Russia, and the 50 Federal States in the US) and individual fixed effects. Clustered standard
errors are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
All
(baseline)
Switzerland Russia Australia USA
Terror in own
countries
Terror in rest
of the world
(GSOEP) (BHPS) (SHP) (RMLS) (HILDA)
All All
Without
Germany
Germany
 United
Kingdom
4 Di¤usion Channels and Exposure
The depressing e¤ect of global terror can be interpreted as selectivecompassion, anger or,
most likely, fear (Becker and Rubinstein, 2011). The di¤usion mechanism can involve multiple
factors. In this section, we use heterogeneity across days to investigate the role of di¤erent
channels: stock markets, anticipations of future economic losses, standard media and social
media. We merge our panel datasets with data sources on stock prices, international economic
relationship and media coverage, among others. We show in particular that economic channels
play a relatively minor role, while media coverage by prominent TV channels lters the most
salient events (but not all of the terror signal). Then, we emphasize the role of physical, genetic
and cultural proximity to the regions and victims of terror, and show how the terror e¤ect
increases when people feel more exposed or involved.
17These calculations based on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institutedatabase, cf. www.sipri.org
18
4.1 Economic Channels
Markets. Global terror may a¤ect sectors that are key for national development (Abadie
and Gardeazabal, 2003). In terms of SWB response to terror, actual damages to the real
economy take time to materialize. A more rapid signal may go through stock markets. Several
studies have investigated the impact of terror on stock prices (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003,
Straetmans et al., 2008) and commodity prices (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2010). Other studies,
in particular Deaton (2012) and Frijters et al. (2015), have shown that SWB closely tracks
the stock market index over time.18 We attempt to connect these two causal channels for our
interpretation by checking whether terror events impinge on well-being through their e¤ect
on stock prices. Expected losses may be associated with a decline in portfolio value. The
consequences of terror may also be broader than this direct wealth e¤ect, since most people do
not have nancial interests in the stock market. As argued by Deaton and Frijters, stock markets
have become the leading indicator of what is happening locally and globally. In particular, they
reect expectations about key outcomes like employment prospects (Frijters et al. 2015).
In order to shed some light on this mechanism, we collect daily information on a variety of
international market indices Itd that we introduce in our controls.19 In Table 3, we include in
turn the following indices: (i) the Dow Jones global index, (ii) stock market closing prices for
each country (the S&P/ASX 50 for Australia, the DAX for Germany, the MOEX for Russia,
the SMI for Switzerland, the FTSE 100 for the UK and the Dow Jones for the US) and (iii)
the international price of gold, in its capacity of store of value. The parameter estimates
of terror intensity are slightly smaller, indicating that some of the signal of terror may pass
through stock and commodity prices.20 Again, this is more likely to reect the role of market
as conveying short-run anxiety about the future than a specic e¤ect on well-being through
personal portfolios. The correlation between terror and stock market uctuations remains
modest: market price daily uctuations carry between 1% and 22% (0% and 17%) of the terror
incidence (fatalities) e¤ect.21 As expected, the largest e¤ects are generated by local stock
indices rather than a general stock index like the Global Dow.
Anticipations of Economic Impacts. Several studies have addressed the global implica-
tions of terror through its e¤ect on trade (Blomberg and Hess, 2006, Egger and Gassebner,
18Deaton uses high frequency data from the US Gallup Survey and the S&P 500 over the years 2008-2010. For
Australia, Frijters et al. (2015) mobilize 12 years of HILDA data and the All Ordinaries Index.
19Similar results are obtained when using daily variation Itd   Itd 1 in the estimations.
20We indicate the drop in the terror coe¢ cients as calculated relatively to baseline estimates on the reduced
samples used here (stock markets data is not available for some years in the 1990s).
21Note that both stock markets and well-being are inuenced by seasonality (seasonal a¤ective disorder, see
Kamstra et al., 2003), which is accounted for by month dummies. We have also used Hodrick-Prescott lter
to eliminate seasonal uctuations, which does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient on terror intensity. Detailed results
available from the authors.
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Table 3: Welfare Impact of Global Terror: Controlling for Stock Fluctuations
Controls: international markets Controls: Economic Relationship with Terror Regions
Global Dow (a) Imports and exports with terror country
Terror Effects -0.0115 *** -0.0062 *** Terror Effects -0.0137 *** -0.0067 ***
(0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0014)
Equivalent Income 0.14 0.07 Equivalent Income 0.16 0.08
Variation to baseline -15% -6% Variation to baseline -1% -3%
#Obs. #Obs.
Local stock market prices (b) Biliteral FDI with terror country
Terror Effects -0.0098 *** -0.0053 *** Terror Effects -0.0166 *** -0.0066 ***
(0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0017)
Equivalent Income 0.12 0.06 Equivalent Income 0.20 0.08
Variation to baseline -22% -17% Variation to baseline -1% -8%
#Obs. #Obs.
International gold prices (ounce) Exchange rates (relative to Japanese yen)
Terror Effects -0.0131 *** -0.0066 *** Terror Effects -0.0127 *** -0.0067 ***
(0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0014)
Equivalent Income 0.15 0.08 Equivalent Income 0.15 0.08
Variation to baseline -1% 0% Variation to baseline -4% 1%
#Obs. #Obs.
Source for market indices: www.bloomberg.com
(b): Australia: S&P/ASX 50, Germany: DAX, Russia: MOEX, Switzerland: SMI, UK: FTSE 100 Index, US Dow Jones.
741,376
Linear estimations of life satisfaction on incidences or fatalities. Models control for individual characteristics (age, education, marital
status, health indicator, household size, # of children, log household income, year, month, country specific region of residence) and
individual fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and
1% levels respectively. Variation to baseline is the change in terror effect coefficients relative to the baseline obtained on the same
(possibly reduced) sample.
(a) Global Dow: Global version of the Dow Jones Global Industrial Average (W1100), including 150-stock indices of corporations
from around the world
Incidences Fatalities Incidences Fatalities
471,326
741,376
727,311
741,376
708,664
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2005, Mierrieks and Gries, 2013) and FDI (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). Another possible
e¤ect is therefore the depressing e¤ect of anticipated losses if terror impairs economic activity
with key trading partners.22 We suggest additional estimations that control for Et+1, the lead
levels of economic exchange between the observation country and the main terror country of
the previous day.23 The intensity of bilateral economic relationships is rst proxied by the an-
nual trade volumes (exports and imports) from the World Input-Output Tables. We also focus
on levels of bilateral foreign direct investments (FDI) as reported by the OECD (only Russia
is excluded due to insu¢ ciency information).24 The right panel of Table 3 shows that terror
e¤ects barely change when we include potential expectations of the economic consequences of
terror.
4.2 Media Channels
Media Coverage. Traditional and social media are the most obvious channel that may
convey information about world terror to the citizens of our sample. For a subgroup of countries
(Germany, the US and the UK) and the 2001-2013 period, we avail of information from a
media research institute (Media Tenor International), which collects daily data on the main
TV channels and newspapers in these countries. We extract the number of broadcasted news
covering a terror event that happened on d  1.25 We then control for a dummy Ztd equal to 1
if at least one terror event was covered in these media. As seen in Table 4 (top-left quadrant),
this media coveragevariable has a very signicant e¤ect. Its coe¢ cient varies only a little
when terror intensity is jointly introduced in the model. Indeed, media coverage by the most
salient TV channels is not only a function of how dramatic the day was. It carries additional
and more qualitative information about terror events and tends to lter the key events that are
most likely to interest a Western audience. In fact, only one-quarter of all global terror events
are reported on the main TV channels.26 Media coverage is therefore a proxy for closeevents.
22The e¤ect will be all the larger as there is a likely economic impact to be expected and/or also because this
reveals a specic proximity to terror regions other non-economic forms of proximities (cultural, religious, etc.)
are checked in what follows.
23Time-demeaned estimations hence account for the forthcoming variation Et+1   Et in economic exchanges
that may a¤ect SWB at time t if individuals correctly anticipate potential losses. Similar results are obtained
when explicitly introducing Et+1   Et in the model (which yields Et+1   Et 1 in time-demeaned form).
24Trade volumes are drawn from www.wiod.org and FDI volumes from https://data.oecd.org
25It is based on a count of all TV appearances from the evening news of day d  1 or the morning news of day d
(time imputation is made, when possible, on the basis of the programs name, for instance "ABC World News
Tonight" or "CBS Evening News"). Data has been acquired from http://us.mediatenor.com/en/ and includes
6 major channels for the UK, 8 for the US and 12 for Germany.
26Additional estimations using terror dummies together with the media coverage dummy show that the former
capture the base e¤ect while the latter reects the surplus characterizing the key news ltered by prominent
media, making it of a similar order of magnitude as the impact of local terror or that of the top quartile of
global terror events.
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We suggest a more extensive analysis of proximity to terror hereafter.
Table 4: HeterogeneousWelfare Impact of Global Terror: Media Use andMedia Terror Coverage
Terror Effects -0.0150 *** -0.0067 *** Daily -0.0169 *** -0.0078 ***
(0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0024)
Variation to baseline -5.7% -6.9% Less frequently -0.0123 -0.0007
(0.0081) (0.0043)
Media Coverage (=1) -0.0285 *** -0.0284 ***
(0.0069) (0.0069) difference (p-value) 0.5998 0.1257
#Obs. 359,354 359,354 #Obs. 223,502 223,502
Covered -0.0208 *** -0.0099 *** Daily -0.0150 *** -0.0089 ***
(0.0064) (0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0027)
Uncovered -0.0127 *** -0.0052 ** Less frequently 0.0001 -0.0042
(0.0041) (0.0022) (0.0077) (0.0045)
difference (p-value) 0.221 0.221 difference (p-value) 0.0566 0.3313
#Obs. 359,354 359,354 #Obs. 234,934 234,934
Fatalities
Terror effects with indiv. heterogeneity: internet use:
Terror effects with indiv. heterogeneity: TV watching:
Linear estimations of life satisfaction on incidences or fatalities. Models control for individual characteristics (age, education, marital
status, health indicator, household size, # of children, log household income, year, month, country specific region of residence), and
individual fixed effects. Left panel: Media coverage is a variable constructed from the Media Tenor International database about
daily TV media coverage in Germany, the US and the UK, which indicates whether at least one global terror event from the past
day appeared in TV news (it is available for Oct 2001-2013 only). Right panel: TV use is available in our micro data for Germany:
1995, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2013; Australia: 2012; UK: 1997-2008; Switzerland: 2010, 2013. Internet use is available for Germany: 2000,
2003, 2008, 2013; Australia: 2010-13; UK: 1997-2008; Switzerland: 2001-08, 2010, 2013; Russia: 2003-13. Clustered standard errors
are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Variation to baseline is the
change in coefficient relative to the baseline obtained on this reduced sample.
Terror effects with daily heterogeneity in media coverage:
Controlling for media coverage of (any) terror event:
FatalitiesIncidences Incidences
Next, we estimate a model with heterogeneous e¤ects whereby terror intensity is interacted
with the media coverage dummy, i.e. Ttd 1 is replaced by fcovZtd + uncov(1  Ztd)gTtd 1.
According to the bottom-left quadrant of Table 4, the e¤ect is around one-third higher (a
quarter lower) than the baseline terror e¤ect when previous day terror has (not) received media
coverage. Interestingly, terror incidence is still highly signicant on days without coverage: the
background noiseof terror still pervades Western households, possibly through other sources
of information including alternative TV programs (not recorded in our media data), social
media and indirect sources of information (like stock markets).
Media Use. For all countries except the US, and for a subset of years, we also avail of
individual information about the use of traditional media (daily hours of TV watching) and
social media (daily hours of internet use). Table 4 (top-right quadrant) shows that daily
TV watchers are most a¤ected by terror. For others, the coe¢ cient on terror incidences is
insignicant, probably due to the smaller sample size, although it is still close to the baseline.
Also, we cannot reject equality of the coe¢ cients for frequent and less frequent watchers. This
result is consistent with the fact that other informational sources matter. Table 4 (bottom-
right quadrant) shows more contrasted e¤ects between daily social media users and others in
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the case of incidences. Given the smaller sample size, these estimates are less precise and
should be taken with caution, especially given that (i) individual behavior regarding media use
is possibly correlated with personal characteristics determining well-being or the perception of
potential terror threats, (ii) such behavior may change over time (while we infer an average
e¤ect from varying terror intensity over 20 years).27
4.3 Proximity to Terror Regions/Victims
We have suggested that specic, more proximate events generate stronger emotional responses
(for instance those occurring locally or those ltered by Western media). We provide further
evidence along these lines. In Table 5, we report heterogeneous e¤ects based on physical, ge-
netic, cultural and religious distance between observed individuals and terror regions/victims.28
Genetic distance is obtained using the data of Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016); this measure is
considered to be an alternative proxy for cultural similarity since genetically similar populations
share common cultures over history. We also dene cultural proximity as belonging to Western
(versus non-Western) populations. Since our sample countries are all predominantly Christian,
religious proximity is approached by the high (versus low) rate of Christians or the low (versus
high) rate of Muslims. We consider the proximity to the countries of terror or, alternatively,
to the nationality of the largest group of victims. For each dimension, we indicate the p-value
of an equality test between heterogeneous e¤ects (H0: 
close = far). The overall picture is
relatively compelling: all forms of proximity to the terror regions/victims yield larger e¤ects.
The equality test is rejected in a majority of cases.29
5 Individual Heterogeneity and Voting Attitude
The previous analysis has suggested that the depressing e¤ect of global terror varies with
the perceived exposure to terror, as proxied by the proximity to events and victims. We
push forward this interpretation and explore terror e¤ect heterogeneity across individuals. The
feeling that terror would eventually a¤ect ones life with a non-negligible probability may be
27Suppose that being interviewed after a large event is the assignment to treatment, while hearing about it
is the treatment. With this interpretation, the terror e¤ect is an unbiased intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate,
while the e¤ect for media users in Table 4 is an endogeneous treatment e¤ect. The ITT is independent from
intervieweescharacteristics (as conveyed by the fact that xed e¤ects hardly a¤ect our results). This reasoning
again applies to a single event: over the multitude of events in our data, it is very unlikely that some people
remains constantly uninformed about the world news and, hence, untreated.
28Similar results are found when using alternatively the distance to the country/victims of the past-day events
or the average distance to all past day terror events.
29This pattern might be interpreted as driven by higher compassion towards the targeted populations, in line
with evolutionary arguments such as altruism and kin selection towards genetically close populations. Most
likely, it reects higher fear and anxiety when the threat becomes closer (or is perceived as such).
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Welfare Impact of Global Terror: Proximity to Terror
Genetic Distance Religious Distance
Geographical distance to the main terror country: Genetic distance to the main terror country: Share of Christians among all victims:
Close (below median) -0.0161 *** -0.0102 *** Close (below median) -0.0190 *** -0.0102 *** High (above median) -0.0275 *** -0.0099 ***
(0.0039) (0.0022) (0.0040) (0.0023) 0.0051 0.0027
Far (above median) -0.0172 *** -0.0039 Far (above median) -0.0031 0.0018 Low (below median) -0.0077 -0.0049
(0.0059) (0.0032) (0.0062) (0.0037) 0.0039 0.0023
difference (p-value) 0.843 0.055 difference (p-value) 0.006 0.001 difference (p-value) 0.000 0.080
#Obs. 705,649 705,649 #Obs. 647,102 647,102 #Obs. 699,536 699,536
Share of Muslims among all victims:
Western countries -0.0226 *** -0.0099 *** Close (below median) -0.0174 *** -0.0101 *** High (above median) -0.0076 * -0.0042
(0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0023) (0.0045) (0.0029)
Other countries -0.0045 -0.0060 *** Far (above median) -0.0057 -0.0010 Low (below median) -0.0181 *** -0.0087 ***
(0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0023)
difference (p-value) 0.000 0.208 difference (p-value) 0.040 0.012 difference (p-value) 0.019 0.129
#Obs. 750,691 750,691 #Obs. 645,089 645,089 #Obs. 699,536 699,536
FatalitiesIncidences Fatalities Incidences Fatalities Incidences
Physical & Cultural Distance
Majority of victims in the main event were from: Genetic distance to the main group of victims:
Linear estimations of life satisfaction on incidences or fatalities. Models control for individual characteristics (age, education, marital status, health indicator,
household size, # of children, log household income, year, month, country specific region of residence) and individual fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are
presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Physical distance distance to the main terror place is
calculated using the centroid of the individual's region of residence and the exact location of terror. Genetic distance is obtained using the main genetic measure of
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) and taking the average of each nationality.
more acute for certain types of people depending on their nature, where they live, etc. Variation
in risk perception across days of di¤erent terror intensity (as characterized before) or across
individual types (as seen below) may also trigger other types of responses and notably changes
in behavior and attitudes. We extend our analysis to voting and test the assumption that
people most a­ icted by terror may also react by seeking protection in parties traditionally
viewed as more conservative. Due to data limitations regarding political attitudes, we focus
our analysis on three countries, namely Germany, the UK and Switzerland.
5.1 Fear Factors
Let us rst focus on the left part of Table 6. We report the e¤ect of global terror on well-
being, overall and by quartiles of terror intensity, for the three-country sample. It is in line
with previous results and interpretations on the broader sample. We then examine the role of
potential fear factors: we report heterogeneous e¤ects along di¤erent dimensions as available
in the data. Older persons, i.e. above median age of 44, are more a¤ected by global terror. The
p-value shows that the age di¤erence is signicant for fatalities. Rich people, dened as the
top quintile of the income distribution, respond more strongly to global terror, possibly feeling
they have more to lose in terms of current material possessions or from the disruption in future
income streams. Admittedly, the di¤erence is not signicant at standard levels.
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The other factors are available for Germany only. We use subjective risk aversion, which has
proven to be a good proxy for di¤erent dimensions of risk attitudes (Dohmen et al., 2011).
It turns out that very risk-averse individuals, i.e. people in the top quintile of the 1-10 risk
aversion scale, are markedly more a­ icted by world terror. The e¤ect is three times larger with
incidences and the di¤erence has a relatively low p-value with fatalities. We also test whether
people react to the fact that terror occurs predominantly in urban areas. We use register
information from the German microcensus at the level of 96 districts ("Raumordnungsregionen"
or ROR). Using a relatively conventional threshold of 200 inhabitants per square kilometer
(roughly the median), we nd a signicantly large e¤ect among those living in densely populated
areas. Finally, people living in areas with a high share of Muslim migrants are also more
distressed: we nd an e¤ect two (incidents) to three times (fatalities) larger than for other
citizens.30 This may be indicative of the information about world terror provided by foreign
neighbors or, alternatively, the fact that the fear is exacerbated by the presence of migrants
from terror countries.31 We have experimented with other characteristics (like education).
They show no specic patterns except gender, which tends to indicate that women respond
more strongly to terror (see also Lerner et al. 2003).
5.2 Voting Attitude
Overview. A growing body of literature addresses the e¤ects of conicts and terrorism on
satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions (Blanco and Ruiz, 2013), political attitudes
and the tradeo¤ between security and democratic support (Rehman and Vanin, 2017, Bozzoli
and Müller, 2011) or prejudices against minorities (Panagopoulos, 2006, Echebarria-Echabe
and Fernandez-Guede, 2006). In this vein, we extend our analysis beyond welfare impacts and
study the potential e¤ect of terror on political attitudes. We investigate whether the people
emotionally a¤ected by global terror also exhibit a change in their political opinion. The social
psychology literature indicates that the fear of death may lead to a move towards defensive
conservatism(Jost et al., 2003). This general psychological response to vulnerability salience is
30Note that living in districts with high share of migrants does not capture the same e¤ect as living in densely-
populated area: population density and migrant share are correlated only at :41.
31This latter interpretation relates to the increased tension between natives and Muslim immigrants in Western
countries following increased terror events due to radical Islamist groups. While we suggest a broad time decom-
position in the concluding section, we report here additional regressions whereby terror e¤ects are interacted
with dummies for 4 di¤erent groups: before/after the 9/11 2001  high/low migrant shares. For incidents, the
largest e¤ects are found in the post-2001 period and are twice as large for those living in districts with high
shares of Muslim migrants ( :0218, s.e. of :0118) compared to those in other districts ( :0101, s.e. of :0055).
For fatalities, we nd insignicant e¤ects for all groups except the post-2001 group of people living in districts
with a high migrant share (coe¢ cient of  :01326, s.e. of :0063). We have also replicated these heterogeneous
estimations when extending the sample to the US (state variation) in addition to Germany (ROR variation),
and nd a similar pattern.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Impact of Global Terror on Well-Being and Conservative Voting
Overall effect (Germany, UK, Switzerland) -0.0186 *** -0.0080 *** 0.0015 ** 0.0006 *
(0.0032) (0.0017) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Q2 -0.0128 *** -0.0111 *** 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0048) (0.0042) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Q3 -0.0243 *** -0.0116 *** 0.0020 * 0.0018 *
(0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Q4 -0.0337 *** -0.0279 *** 0.0023 * 0.0020 *
(0.0064) (0.0048) (0.0013) (0.0011)
#Obs.
Heterogeneity: age  (Germany, UK, Switzerland)
Above median -0.0189 *** -0.0096 *** 0.0016 ** 0.0008 *
(0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Below median -0.0172 *** -0.0050 ** 0.0000 -0.0002
(0.0044) (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0005)
difference (p-value) 0.7307 0.0730 0.1618 0.0931
#Obs.
Top quintile -0.0227 *** -0.0097 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0011 **
(0.0040) (0.0022) (0.0009) (0.0004)
Lower quintiles -0.0168 *** -0.0073 *** 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0036) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0004)
difference (p-value) 0.1202 0.2714 0.0008 0.0261
#Obs.
Top quintile -0.0248 ** -0.0142 ** 0.0033 0.0028 *
(0.0113) (0.0062) (0.0028) (0.0015)
Low quintiles -0.0087 * -0.0023 0.0003 0.0006
(0.0050) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0007)
difference (p-value) 0.1796 0.0709 0.3282 0.1713
#Obs.
High (>200 pers per km2) -0.0181 *** -0.0064 * 0.0029 * 0.0018 **
(0.0065) (0.0034) (0.0016) (0.0009)
Low -0.0012 -0.0030 -0.0008 -0.0001
(0.0066) (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.0009)
difference (p-value) 0.0490 0.4615 0.1034 0.1108
#Obs.
Top quintile -0.0211 ** -0.0118 ** 0.0037 * 0.0027 **
(0.0103) (0.0054) (0.0019) (0.0012)
Low quintiles -0.0099 * -0.0034 0.0008 0.0007
(0.0051) (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0007)
p-value 0.3135 0.1471 0.2510 0.1294
#Obs.
Linear estimations of life satisfaction/conservative voting on incidences or fatalities. Models control for
individual characteristics (age, education, marital status, health indicator, household size, # of children, log
household income, year, month, country specific region of residence) and individual fixed effects. Clustered
standard errors are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively. Qualitatively similar results are obtained for life satisfaction when restricting the sample to
observations for which voting behavior is observed. For Germany, registered information on immigration is
available at the 96 counties level; the correlation between migrant shares and population density is .41. Muslim
migrants are defined as those from countries that which are predominantly Muslim (more than 75%).
482,758 323,303
Heterogeneity: risk aversion (Germany)
264,955 121,745
Heterogeneity: local population density (Germany)
235,144 108,711
Heterogeneity: local share of Muslim migrants (Germany)
272,065 124,739
Heterogeneity: income (Germany, UK, Switzerland)
Life Satisfaction
Intention to Vote for
Conservative Parties
Incidences Fatalities Incidences Fatalities
482,758 323,303
482,758 323,303
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explained by the core conservative values of authority, stability and order providing a comforting
anchor (Nail et al., 2009). Such a conservative shift is also consistent with several economic
studies nding that the fear inspired by terror makes individuals more likely to vote for right-
leaning parties (Berrebi and Klor, 2006, 2008, Gould and Klor, 2010, Kibris 2011, Getmansky
and Zeitzo, 2014, Schüller, 2015).32 In what follows, we originally relate the potential change in
political attitudes to the varying degree of risk perception as measured by emotional responses
to terror.33
Approach and Motivation. We rely on the question about political orientation in our
German, British and Swiss panels and sum up voting intentions in favor of the right-side of the
political spectrum of each country. For instance, for Germany, we add voting intentions in favor
of the traditional right-wing parties (CDU and CSU) and the ultra-nationalists (NPD). The
main conservative party, the CDU, is perceived as supporting stronger punishments of crimes,
stronger involvement on the part of the Bundeswehr in cases of anti-terrorism o¤ensives and
tougher control on immigration. The voting intention variable is used to construct a dummy
"intention to vote for conservative parties", denoted as Cons. We use the same identication
approach as before and estimate the model:
Consitd = 
cTtd 1 +Xitdc + 
c
t + 
c
d + '
c
i + eitd: (4)
Recall that the e¤ect is driven by uctuation in terror intensity over twenty years. Eliciting the
potential change in political views would still be important if we focused on a single event/day.
Indeed, elections may occur in the wake of large terror events or are possibly manipulated
by attacks specically organized a few days before the poll (as suggested in Montalvo, 2011).
However, we exploit the repeated exposure to a continuous ow of events of varying intensity.
Thus, the change in political attitudes may not be short-lived. Most likely, the way in which
global terror alters political opinions on average over the long-period may entail deep behavioral
consequences on actual voting.
Results and Interpretations. The right panel of Table 6 rst reports the causal impact of
terror on next-day intentions to support conservative parties in Germany, the UK and Switzer-
land. We see that global terror over the period has contributed to a signicant rightward shift
32The study of Montalvo (2011) seems to show an opposite e¤ect: the 2004 Madrid bombing would have
inuenced elections in favor of the socialist party, which was prone to a withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.
Yet it does not necessarily correspond to a left-wing shift. First, the outcome seems to be essentially due to
the incumbent conservative governments handling of the attack. Second, several studies point to an increased
anti-Arab sentiment and a displacement toward more conservative values and political ideals in Spain following
the attack (Echebarria-Echabe and Fernandez-Guede, 2006).
33Note that several studies look at the link between SWB and voting, see Liberini et al. (2017) for recent
evidence and more references.
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in these countries. We can quantify the overall impact cT td 1 using the mean values for ter-
ror incidents or fatalities. It yields an overall increase in conservative vote share by around
:0018  :0035 percentage points, i.e. a 1:1%  1:9% increase compared to the average over the
period. Just like for welfare responses, changes in political orientation are not (only) driven by
large events like 9/11: Table 6 shows that political response gradually increases with quartiles
of terror intensity.
The psychology literature indicates that fear and distress can mediate political responses to
terrorism through an increased perception of self-relevant threats, prompting the demand for
stronger anti-terrorism policies and consistent with such a conservative shift (Lerner et al.,
2003). While the evidence is mainly experimental (Nail et al., 2009), our results tend to cor-
roborate this nding at a much larger scale if the daily variation in terror intensity used for
identication is indeed interpreted as variation in the degree of perceived exposure. We can
proceed a little further in this direction. First, using heterogeneity across days, we nd larger
political responses when terror concerns victims who are physically or genetically proximate
(unreported), i.e. situations that were previously characterized as generating larger emotional
responses. Second, using heterogeneity across individuals, we can establish a correspondence
between those previously identied as most a­ icted by terror and those who exhibit a stronger
conservative shift. While we cannot exactly associate those who respond emotionally to terror
with those who changed their political attitude, the co-movement based on observed hetero-
geneity is striking (see Table 6): conservative shifts also come from the older, richer and more
risk averse, as well as those living in densely-populated areas and districts with a high share
of Muslim migrants. This last set of results is strongly suggestive that a common mechanism
increases risk perception as characterized by well-being responses and triggers a shift in
political views.
6 Concluding Discussion
The literature in economics, political science and psychology essentially focuses on the local
impact of terror. We originally evaluate the welfare cost of global terror. We construct a unique
pool of panel data for 1994-2013, comprising six countries: Australia, Germany, Switzerland,
Russia, the UK and the US. World terror incidences or fatalities are matched with self-reported
well-being information for citizens of these countries. Identication is obtained by daily vari-
ation in terror intensity over 20 years. It hinges on the fact that the world terror is broadly
exogenous to the timing of interviews. Individual xed e¤ects are also included using panel
information, although unobserved heterogeneity has little inuence on our estimates, indicat-
ing that between(daily) variation in terror intensity provides robust identication. We nd
a large negative and highly statistically signicant e¤ect of terror incidences/fatalities on the
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well-being of Western citizens. This result holds overall and for most countries independently.
Heterogeneity in days of terror shows that exposure matters: e¤ects are signicantly larger
when terror regions/victims are physically, genetically or culturally close to the interviewees.
Proximity also relates to the way in which terror news is di¤used. Stock prices carry only little
information compared to traditional media. However, the background noise of terror plays
a signicant role even when terror events are not reported on prominent TV channels (but
possibly conveyed by social media and other information sources). Individual heterogeneity
also points to a larger distress e¤ect among older and risk-averse citizens as well as those living
in areas perceived as risky (e.g. urban areas or close to migrants from terror regions). Fear and
anxiety may also change economic behavior. For a subset of countries, we show that those most
a­ icted by terror also respond by a shift in political attitudes towards conservative parties,
which typically promise more homeland security and a tougher stance on terrorism.
There are two important aspects concerning these results. First, both welfare and political
responses are causally obtained by high-frequency variation in terror intensity and o¤er good
external validity given the large samples used. Second, our results are consistent with the fact
that not only the direct exposure to terror, but also the mere perceived threat of terrorist
attacks even from countries far away can a¤ect well-being and political preferences (Get-
mansky and Zeitzo, 2014). In fact, the magnitude of SWB responses, and the existence of a
shift in political attitudes, show how exacerbated the perception of global terror can be we
nd a high money-metric cost of the global terror exerted over 1994-2013 (between 6% and 17%
of average income across modeling assumptions). This is in line with the fact that risk per-
ceptions can substantially deviate from actual risks in the case of rare events that have a large
impact, like terrorist acts. This extreme-event bias is founded on di¤erent phenomena such as
probability neglect (Sunstein, 2003) and the availability heuristic à la Tversky-Kahneman. It
is especially striking given that the responses captured in this paper are essentially driven by
events taking place abroad, with little chance to impact upon Western citizenslives. Indeed,
only 107 casualties are reported in the GTD over 20 years in Australia, Switzerland, Germany
and the UK together. Most of the 3; 254 fatalities counted in the US are due to only one event
namely 9/11 and represent only 1% of the death toll from gun res.
Something missing from our analysis is the variation over time. There are many interesting
related questions to address in future research, for instance the extent to which fear adds up
to the social and political consequence of the 2008 economic crisis. Another time analysis
would disentangle the intensication of terror (highlighted in Figure 1) from the increased
mediatization of terror (through global news and the accelerated use of social media).34 Even
though we have assembled the best available panel datasets over a relatively long period, we
34Several studies have analyzed the fact that media di¤use fear, hatred, sympathy, etc., and hence change
behavior such as radical voting (Della-Vigna et al., 2014) or social capital and trust (Olken, 2009).
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could not extract time trends in a convincing manner. Indeed, countries enter the panel at
various points in time, so that the identication of time e¤ects is problematic (di¤erent periods
reect the weight of specic countries). It is nonetheless possible to do so for single countries
like Germany, since the GSOEP is a relatively large dataset covering a long period of time.
We can o¤er one nal result for this country, using year 2003 (Iraq war) as a turnaround point
after which global terror increased dramatically (see Figure 1). We nd that life satisfaction
decreased by 0:5% between 1994-2002 and 2003-13 in Germany, with one-third of this change
essentially explained by the sharp intensication of terror over the recent period.35
Further work should also expand our approach in three main directions. First, future studies
could replicate our results for more countries and di¤erent regions of the world. Many panel
datasets are now available in poorer regions. It is particularly important to establish the
connection between life conditions, perceived well-being and political views in countries where
the support for democratic values is weak or possibly undermined by repeated exposure to
nearby terror (Blanco and Ruiz, 2013, Rehman and Vanin, 2017). Second, future work could
apply similar methodologies to other outcomes including the tradeo¤ between security policies
and civil liberties, the rejection of minorities or citizen views on migration policies, defense
policies and military expenditure, or economic protectionism. Another set of relevant outcomes
pertains to deep changes in time and risk preferences or social capital.36 Third, the literature
on SWB has recently emphasized the power of various SWB measures to predict a broad range
of health, demographic and economic behavior (De Neve et al., 2013). Political behavior and
attitudes have not received much attention in this literature. Our results suggest that signicant
shocks on SWB may be used as a yardstick to determine the extent of terror that is likely
to generate a triggerability in political behavior or attitudes towards democracy, minorities,
security or migration policies.
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A Appendix A: Data and Statistics
A.1 Harmonizing Panel Datasets
Harmonizing Well-Being Measures. The life-satisfaction question is relatively compara-
ble across the di¤erent datasets at use. In the GSOEP, SHP and HILDA, the question is framed
as: "How satised are you with your life as a whole, all things considered?". In the BHPS:
"How dissatised or satised are you with your life overall?". In the RMLS: "To what extend
are you satised with your life in general at the present time". In the PSID: "Please think
about your life-as-a-whole. How satised are you with it?". The answer is reported on di¤erent
scales: 5 points in the RMLS and PSID, 7 in the BHPS and 11 in the other countries. In
ascending order of satisfaction, answers are scaled as follows: from 0 ("not at all satised") to
4 ("fully satised") in the RMLS, from 5 ("not at all satised") to 1 ("completely satised") in
the PSID, from 1 ("completely dissatised") to 7 ("completely satised") in the BHPS, from
0 ("completely dissatised") to 10 ("completely satised") in the GSOEP, SHP and HILDA.
Hence, it is necessary to harmonize the scales across datasets.
Since a majority of countries have an 11-point scale, our baseline approach consists in expanding
the life-satisfaction answers in the PSID, the RLMS and the BHPS to 11 points. For each
individual in the PSID and RLMS, we draw a random discrete number in the intervals [0-2],
[3-4], [5-6], [7-8], [9-10] for ordinal values 1 to 5 respectively (and similarly in 7 intervals in the
BHPS). The best approach consists in bootstrapping estimations over a large number of such
draws. Yet, this gave indi¤erentiable results compare to a single draw, which we use for most
of our analysis. We have also tried di¤erent reasonable assignments rules for the denition
of segments, again without much di¤erence with baseline results. Results with bootstrapped
estimations and alternative denitions are available from the authors.
An alternative approach, presented in our sensitivity checks, involves collapsing answers to the
least common denominator, i.e. the 5-point scale used in the RMLS and the PSID.37 The mean
level of SWB for each country is reported in Table A.1, in their original scale (rst row), in the
0-10 harmonized scale (second row) and in the 1-5 harmonized scale (third row). The country
ordering based on mean values is consistent across scales, with the highest score in Switzerland
and the lowest in Russia.
Common Determinants of Well-Being. We aim to warrant the comparability of control
variables across samples. Some determinants of SWB are readily comparable across countries
and over time (e.g., age, gender, marital status, family size). We detail here the treatment of
key variables in well-being regression, namely income, employment, health status and education
37That is, we assign values 1 to 5 to the intervals [0-2], [3-4], [5-6], [7-8] and [9-10] respectively, in the GSOEP,
SHP and HILDA, and to intervals [0-1], [2-3], [4-4], [5-5], [6-7] respectively, in the BHPS.
37
(see Clark et al., 2008, Senik, 2005). Income is dened in all surveys as the sum of all income
sources in the household after governmental transfers. We simply convert household income
into 2011 USD (using World Bank indicators). The employment status is a dummy variable
which indicates whether people are currently employed. The most common denition of health
is the self-assessed health variable, rescaled in an ascending order, i.e. from very poor (1) to
very good (5).38 We control for the number of years of schooling, as provided for in the GSOEP,
SHP, HILDA and PSID; we had to reconstruct this variable for the UK and Russia using the
highest education level achieved and information about education systems.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Germany
United
Kingdom
Switzerland
Russia
Federation
Australia USA
All
Countries
GSOEP
(1994-2013)
BHPS
(1996-2018)
SHP
(1999-2013)
RLMS
(2000-2013)
HILDA
(2000-2013)
PSID
(2009-2013)
Life satisfaction: country-specific scale (a) 7.00 5.17 8.00 3.01 7.90 3.77 6.01
(1.754) (1.260) (1.347) (1.124) (1.440) (0.867) (2.285)
Life satisfaction: 0-10 harmonized scale (b) 7.00 8.06 8.00 5.48 7.90 7.03 7.11
(1.754) (1.563) (1.347) (2.343) (1.440) (1.758) (1.992)
Life satisfaction: 1-5 harmonized scale (c) 3.38 4.06 4.00 3.01 3.94 3.77 3.57
(1.060) (1.075) (0.890) (1.124) (0.950) (0.867) (1.113)
Female (=1) 0.517 0.540 0.560 0.573 0.532 0.318 0.529
(0.500) (0.498) (0.496) (0.495) (0.499) (0.466) (0.499)
Age 45.3 43.6 47.1 43.2 42.6 42.9 44.2
(15.612) (15.650) (15.236) (15.894) (15.518) (14.074) (15.639)
Married (=1) 0.598 0.690 0.612 0.668 0.663 0.463 0.633
(0.490) (0.463) (0.487) (0.471) (0.473) (0.499) (0.482)
Household size 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.3 2.9 2.9 2.9
(1.231) (1.328) (1.392) (1.486) (1.442) (1.555) (1.361)
Household income (2011 USD) (d) 45,960 55,320 103,460 12,930 67,630 69,770 48,800
(37,310) (42,610) (96,420) (38,020) (62,620) (106,220) (55,440)
Currently employed (=1) 0.621 0.659 0.730 0.632 0.705 0.718 0.651
(0.485) (0.474) (0.444) (0.482) (0.456) (0.450) (0.477)
Health Status (5-point scale) 3.4 3.8 4.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.5
(0.928) (0.935) (0.635) (0.693) (0.949) (1.036) (0.915)
#Observations (individual x time) 301,679 140,600 40,479 134,846 108,164 24,923 750,691
(b) The scales are harmonized into a 11-point scale (0-10)
(c) The scales are harmonized into a 5-point scale (1-5)
(d) Household income is converted into USD using yearly average exchange rates.
Source: Own calculations from GSOEP, BHPS, SHP, RLMS, HILDA and PSID. The samples retains individuals aged 18-75 years old and excludes first-
generation migrants. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
(a) Measured on a 11-points scale in GSOEP, SHP and HILDA, a 7-point scale in the BHPS, a 5-point scale in PSID and RLMS.
38Self-assessed health is widely used in health economics, and despite being subjective, it has been shown to
predict disability, chronic diseases and health care utilization (Jusot et al., 2013).
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A.2 Global Terror Data and Time Matching
Table A.2: Portrait of Terror: Breakdown of Fatalities and Incidences (1994-2013)
incidences
(%)
fatalities
(%)
incidences
(%)
fatalities
(%)
incidences
(%)
fatalities
(%)
incidences
(%)
fatalities
(%)
All Terror Events 70,118 18.51 36.12 0.51 0.46 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.14
(13.38) (52.90) (0.50) (0.50) (0.20) (0.40) (0.21) (0.21) (0.34) (0.34)
Daily Mean Terror by Years
1994 3,455 12.41 27.33 0.33 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.01
(6.62) (87.52) (0.47) (0.37) (0.06) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.28) (0.11)
1995 3,079 14.31 20.01 0.26 0.28 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.04
(13.44) (26.43) (0.44) (0.45) (0.08) (0.21) (0.16) (0.21) (0.31) (0.20)
2000 1,777 7.86 16.30 0.50 0.30 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.07
(6.53) (19.76) (0.50) (0.46) (0.14) (0.25) (0.27) (0.32) (0.40) (0.26)
2005 2,010 7.92 22.75 0.53 0.62 0.10 0.37 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.11
(4.17) (23.63) (0.50) (0.49) (0.30) (0.48) (0.22) (0.18) (0.32) (0.32)
2010 4,782 16.09 23.65 0.52 0.56 0.04 0.30 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.12
(9.11) (22.99) (0.50) (0.50) (0.19) (0.46) (0.25) (0.22) (0.32) (0.33)
2013 11,952 36.35 65.34 0.56 0.55 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.21
(12.15) (37.52) (0.50) (0.50) (0.22) (0.40) (0.21) (0.22) (0.40) (0.41)
Daily Mean Terror by World Regions
North and Central America 1,561 11.47 30.72 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.69 0.04 0.01 0.16 0.71
(8.94) (154.83) (0.43) (0.24) (0.08) (0.46) (0.19) (0.08) (0.36) (0.45)
South America 3,835 13.35 29.79 0.43 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.18
(9.78) (47.40) (0.50) (0.43) (0.04) (0.12) (0.31) (0.32) (0.38) (0.38)
East/Southeast Asia & Oceania 6,537 19.01 34.24 0.40 0.29 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.12
(14.04 (40.21) (0.49) (0.45) (0.07) (0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.39) (0.33)
South and Central Asia 23,679 19.78 36.06 0.51 0.49 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.07
(13.21) (35.89) (0.50) (0.50) (0.22) (0.41) (0.23) (0.19) (0.31) (0.26)
Western and Eastern Europe 4,910 13.87 24.24 0.59 0.46 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.30
(12.53) (47.62) (0.49) (0.50) (0.06) (0.25) (0.10) (0.09) (0.40) (0.46)
Russia and New Ind. Countries 2,314 14.25 30.07 0.54 0.51 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.17
(10.46) (78.09) (0.50) (0.50) (0.18) (0.38) (0.18) (0.39) (0.26) (0.37)
Middle East and North Africa 21,259 20.01 40.29 0.61 0.64 0.07 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.15
(14.24) (48.52) (0.49) (0.48) (0.26) (0.45) (0.17) (0.16) (0.32) (0.35)
Sub-Saharan Africa 6,023 18.26 41.11 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.12
(12.13) (73.26) (0.46) (0.38) (0.14) (0.19) (0.30) (0.27) (0.37) (0.33)
Notes: authors' calculations using the Global Terrorism Database 1994-2013. Fatalities represent the number of persons killed. Incidences are the counts of all terror
events. Decomposition is given in % of all events, for instance: 51% of all events corresponds to explosion-bombing attacks. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Explosion-bombing Suicide bombing
Longer than 24
hours
Multiple attacksTotal #
events
Daily mean
# fatalities
(excluding
zeros)
Attack Characteristics: Breakdown
Daily mean
# incidences
(excluding
zeros)
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Figure A.1: The Geography of Terror
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Table A.3: Distribution of Interviews and Terror Incidences by Months
Distribution
of terror
events
Germany
United
Kingdom
Switzerland
Russian
Federation
Australia USA
GSOEP
(1994-2013)
BHPS
(1996-2008)
SHP
(1999-2013)
RLMS
(2000-2013)
HILDA
(2000-2013)
PSID
(2009-2013)
January .079 .057 .108 .037 .044 .018 .008 .000
February .071 .131 .310 .022 .009 .009 .008 -
March .081 .108 .249 .019 - .007 .000 .121
April .083 .062 .129 .013 - - - .249
May .090 .040 .076 .009 - - - .234
June .084 .024 .047 - - - - .165
July .092 .017 .034 - - - .003 .089
August .090 .036 .020 - .008 - .176 .051
September .078 .177 .013 .409 .326 .007 .517 .028
October .088 .214 .009 .315 .384 .546 .210 .023
November .088 .105 .003 .137 .176 .324 .066 .022
December .077 .029 .001 .040 .054 .089 .012 .018
Notes: authors' calculations using the Global Terrorism Database and the panel datasets as indicated. The figures are calculated by
averaging over all waves of the panels.
Distribution of interviews
All
Countries
All
Countries
Figure A.2: Daily Distribution of Interviews around Salient Events (GSOEP)
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B Appendix B: Sensitivity Analysis and Additional Re-
sults
B.1 Alternative Controls
In Table B.1, we compare the baseline (column 1) to alternative specications in terms of
controls. We raise a specic point about our fatality measure: it might capture the specic
form of terror, for instance the shock of a bombing attack, rather than the death toll associated
with it. This apparent omitted variable can actually be controlled for with the inclusion of
vector Ctd 1. This vector comprises dummies for attack specicities (multiple attacks, extended
attack, suicide attack), attack types (explosion/bombing, armed assault, assassination, etc.),
the three criteria dening terror (intentionality, intention to coerce/intimidate/publicize to a
large audience, standing outside international humanitarian law), and 13 broad world regions
where terror took place (as summarized in Table A.2). We cannot include the characteristics of
all previous-day events but focus on those of the largest event (dened by the total number of
killed and wounded). In this way, we capture the visibility of this event and more qualitative
forms of intensity about the previous day terror (like the shock from suicide bombing or from
particularly long attacks). Table B.1 rst check the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of
these characteristics Ctd 1 (column 2). These characteristics are not correlated with the number
of events, and indeed the coe¢ cient hardly changes. They relate slightly more to the number
of fatalities insofar as the main event has been responsible for most of the human losses of
that day (as captured in the type of attack, for instance explosion/bombing). Still, coe¢ cients
on the number of fatalities are not a¤ected. These results indicate that our main measures of
terror intensity capture well the world climate of terror and not the specicities of a large
and possibly highly mediatized event.39
Then, we compare our baseline to estimations including additional information about terror
events. Column 3 includes the full set of country dummies for places where past-day terror took
place. It is expected to bring some collinearity with the terror incidences variable especially.
Arguably, the fact that an attack took place in Iraq rather than in Germany necessarily brings
additional information rather than the mere count of terror events. Nonetheless, we want to
know whether adding this information a¤ects our terror intensity measures. Formally, if the
model includes binary e¤ects for J countries,
P
j j1(countryj = 1), then terror incidences is
written Ttd 1 =
P
j 1(countryj = 1) if there is no multiple events in a country on a given
day. This is equivalent to replacing Ttd 1 by
P
j(j + )1(countryj = 1):  represents the
average e¤ect of world terror and j capture country-specic deviation to it. This explains why
terror e¤ects are relatively similar to the baseline in this case (column 3). While Ctd 1 contains
39Note that the R-squared of a regression of fatalities on Ctd 1 is only :12.
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only the identity of the world region where the main event took place, country e¤ects carry
interesting information since terror in specic countries may have more or less repercussions on
individual welfare.
We pursue the sensitivity check by controlling for measures of the proximity to terror (in the
text, proximity measures are used for heterogeneous e¤ects). Column 4 includes the log average
physical distance to previous day terror events while column 5 includes the log average genetic
distance between the individual (based on his/her country) and countries where previous-day
terror took place.40 In both cases, our e¤ects are relatively similar to the baseline.41
B.2 Varying Estimation Methods
In Table B.2, we compare estimations methods. Column 1 reports baseline results using xed
e¤ects estimations. Column 2 shows estimates from a model using Mundlaks quasi-xed e¤ects
(QFE). This approach combines both between and within variation. The individual e¤ect is
based on a slightly more structural specication where 'i = Zi + Wit + ui includes time-
invariant variables Zi that are otherwise captured by xed e¤ects (gender, country, cohort,
etc.), within-means of relevant time-variant variables Wit (household income, household size,
age and health) and a normally-distributed random e¤ect ui. The results do not show particular
deviation from the baseline estimates. In column 3, we report estimates based on a discrete
model. We acknowledge the ordinal nature of the dependent variable and allow for unobserved
individual e¤ects in this nonlinear context by using the "Blow-Up and Cluster" xed e¤ects
ordered logit (see Baetschmann et al., 2015). The coe¢ cients are still very signicant for both
incidences and fatalities. They are around twice larger (these are not marginal e¤ects) and
so are the coe¢ cients on log income, so that equivalent income e¤ects are very much in line
with basic results. Finally, column 4 points to smaller but still signicant e¤ects when ignoring
individual e¤ects in pooled linear regressions. Overall, our conclusions are not dramatically
40For each respondent, we use the centroids (central latitude and longitude) of the smallest geographical area
in the sample (ex: German county or "Raumordnungsregionen", US states, etc.). For genetics, we rely on the
database on genetic distances among various world populations collected by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016). For
both physical and genetic distances, we have run alternative estimations using distance to the largest event
(with respect to the number of fatalities) rather than the mean distance to all events. Results, available from
the authors, are highly similar.
41We also notice that our average treatment e¤ect is based on a measure that gives equal weights to all terror
incidents of the previous day, irrespective of their distance to the respondentslocation. To calculate a distance-
weighted sum of total number of fatalities, we denote ff1;d; :::; fnd;dg the vector of fatality counts on day d
and for event i = 1; :::; nd and  = f1;d; :::; nd;dg the vector of distances to each event of day d using events
geographical coordinates. Rather than a fatality count
Pnd
i=1 fi;d, we can calculate a closeness-weighted sum
of fatalities
Pnd
i=1(1   i;dmax(d) )fi;d. In this case, the e¤ect is again very similar to the baseline and highly
statistically signicant.
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Table B.1: Welfare Impact of Global Terror: Sensitivity to Terror Location Controls
# Incidences (log) -0.0148 *** -0.0155 *** -0.0155 *** -0.0153 *** -0.0125 ***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0036)
Equivalent Income -0.174 -0.182 -0.182 -0.180 -0.147
# Fatalities (log) -0.0076 *** -0.0072 *** -0.0080 *** -0.0083 *** -0.0066 ***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Equivalent Income -0.090 -0.085 -0.094 -0.098 -0.078
R-Squared 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077
#Observations 750,691 750,691 750,691 705,649 647,102
Individual Effect FE FE FE FE FE
Terror characteristics NO YES YES YES YES
Countries of terror dummies NO NO YES NO NO
Average physical distance NO NO NO YES NO
Average genetic distance NO NO NO NO YES
(2)
Linear estimations of life satisfaction on incidences (# or dummy) or fatalities (# or dummy). Models control for
individual characteristics (age, education, marital status, health indicator, household size, # of children, log household
income, year, month, country specific region of residence) and individual fixed effects. Sensitivity: (1) is our baseline, (2)
includes the terror characteristics of the past-day main event comprising attack specificities (multiple attacks, extended
attack, suicide attack), attack types (armed assault, assassination, explosion/bombing, etc.), the 3 terrorism definition
critieria, and 13 broad world regions, (3) additionally controls for dummies of countries where all terror events took place,
(4) controls for the average distance to these countries, (4) controls for the average genetic distance to these countries.
Clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% levels
respectively.
(1): baseline (3) (4) (5)
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a¤ected by (the way we account for) individual heterogeneity, which conrms the robustness
of an identication strategy based on cross-sectional variation in interview days around terror
events of di¤erent intensities.
Table B.2: Welfare Impact of Global Terror: Sensitivity to Estimation Methods
# Incidences (log) -0.0148 *** -0.0151 *** -0.0278 *** -0.0130 ***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0052) (0.0030)
Log(Household Income) 0.0849 *** 0.0997 *** 0.1741 *** 0.1259 ***
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0066) (0.0028)
Equivalent Income -0.174 -0.151 -0.160 -0.103
# Fatalities (log) -0.0076 *** -0.0078 *** -0.0148 *** -0.0076 ***
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0016)
Log(Household Income) 0.0848 *** 0.0996 *** 0.1740 *** 0.1258 ***
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0066) (0.0028)
Equivalent Income -0.090 -0.078 -0.085 -0.060
R-Squared 0.077 0.671 0.043 0.672
#Observations 750,691 750,691 750,691 750,691
Individual Effect FE QFE FE none
Estimation Method linear linear ologit linear
Estimations of life satisfaction on incidences (# or dummy) or fatalities (# or dummy). Models
control for individual characteristics (age, education, marital status, health indicator, household
size, # of children, log household income, year, month, country specific region of residence).
Individual effects are modelled as: (1) fixed effects (FE), (2) Mundlak's quasi-fixed effects
(QFE), which include country fixed effects and the mean value over time for key variables
(income, education, household size, health and age) plus a random effect. All estimations are
linear except in (3), which uses an ordered logit ``blow and cluster" approach with FE.
Clustered standard errors are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance level
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
(1): baseline (2) (3) (4)
B.3 Alternative Terror/SWB Measures
Table B.3 rst reports the baseline, which relies on the log of incidence/fatality counts (Column
1). Column 2 shows marginal e¤ects obtained when incidences and fatalities are introduced
jointly in the model. Note that the correlation between incidences and fatalities is relatively high
(:59) if we exclude the top-5 events, which account for more than 400 fatalities. When including
those, the correlation is more modest (:23). As expected, estimates for both measures become
smaller when added jointly: two-thirds of the baseline for incidences and half for fatalities. They
are nonetheless still signicant, at 5% and 10% respectively. Column 3 adopts the specication
of Frey et al. (2009) whereby incidences and fatalities are included in a linear (rather than
log) specication. In equivalent terms, we obtain larger e¤ects, especially for incidences. Yet
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they are not statistically di¤erent from the baseline.42 Column 4 reports estimates where
terror intensity is replaced by dummy variables, i.e. whether terror events occurred or whether
people got killed the previous day. As discussed, such an extensive margin does not provide
much variation (only 3:7% of the 7; 305 days are exempt from terror incidents), so that the
insignicant e¤ect for incidence is not surprising. There is a little more extensive-margin
variation with respect to fatalities, which may explain that we obtain a signicant e¤ect in this
case. Anyhow, it is expected that the mere occurrence of an event somewhere in the world
has little impact we have rather embraced the variation in global terror intensity. Finally, in
column 5, we check the sensitivity of our results to the way in which we harmonize SWB scales
across countries. With the 5-point scale, coe¢ cients are necessarily smaller in magnitude and
actually not far from half of the coe¢ cients obtained with the 11-point scale.
Table B.3: Welfare Impact of Global Terror: Additional Sensitivity Checks
Incidences -0.0148 *** -0.0096 ** -0.2133 *** -0.0069 -0.0082 ***
(0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0408) (0.0097) (0.0018)
Equivalent Income -0.17 -0.11 -0.26 -0.08 -0.12
Fatalities -0.0076 *** -0.0038 * -0.0071 *** -0.0154 *** -0.0043 ***
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0051) (0.0010)
Equivalent Income -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 -0.13 -0.06
R-Squared 0.077 0.080 0.080 0.072 0.210
#Obs. 750,691 750,691 750,691 750,691 750,691
Linear estimations of life satisfaction on incidences or fatalities. Models control for individual characteristics (age, education,
marital status, health indicator, household size, # of children, log household income, year, month, country specific region of
residence) and individual fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are presented in the parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance
level at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
log (#incidence+1) and
log(#fatalities+1)
simultaneously in the
same regression
#incidence or
# fatalities (linear
rather than log)
SWB harmonized on
a 5-point scale
log(#incidence+1) or
log(#fatalities+1) :
baseline
Dummies for Terror
Events or Fatalities
B.4 Sensitivity to Timing.
Time matching is a di¢ cult exercise given that multiple terror events can occur on a given day,
they can last several hours and the exact timing is generally unknown. Our baseline has focused
on previous-day events for clarity. Terror events that take place on the interview day may also
matter, insofar as they occurred prior to the interview. We have mentioned in the main text
that the past-day assumption may slightly underestimate the treatment e¤ect if, among the
control group, some people are observed on the event day and already a¤ected by the event.
The same-day assumption also carries some fuzziness since individuals observed on the event
42The 95% condence interval for our incidences equivalent income e¤ect is [ :29; :13] in the baseline log
specication and [ :36; :16] with a linear form of terror incidence.
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day but before the event happens are not yet treated. Table B.4 compares our baseline for
incidences and fatalities (column 1) with the alternative matching of interviews with same-day
events (column 2). The e¤ect is smaller in this case but still signicant. We nally test the
e¤ect from terror events occurring either on the interview day or the previous day (column
3). The results show a larger depressing impact using incidences yet not signicantly larger
compared to the baseline since SWB is potentially impacted by more events. For fatalities,
the point estimate coincides with the baseline. We have also run placebo estimations using
events occurring the next day, which consistently lead to a zero e¤ect (unreported).
Table B.4: Welfare Impact of Global Terror: Timing
Terror on:
# Incidences (log) -0.0148 *** -0.0079 *** -0.0172 ***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0030)
Equivalent Income 0.17 0.09 0.20
# Fatalities (log) -0.0076 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0077 ***
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0017)
Equivalent Income 0.09 0.04 0.09
R-Squared 0.077 0.071 0.081
#Obs. 750,691 750,691 750,691
Day before
interview :
baseline
Linear estimations of life satisfaction on incidences or fatalities. Models control for
individual characteristics (age, education, marital status, health indicator,
household size, # of children, log household income, year, month, country specific
region of residence) and individual fixed effects. Clustered standard errors are
presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%
levels respectively.
Interview Day
Interview day
and previous
day
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